the mention of Bentham and punishment. 5 It is important to stress, therefore, that before embarking upon any consideration of Bentham's penal theory, it is necessary first to dissociate the pervasive and pejorative ideas surrounding the panopticon prison from the underlying penal theory upon which the scheme for imprisonment was based. Surveillance, control, and regimentation are not the inevitable products of
Bentham's thinking on punishment, and the panopticon project, which emphasised such concepts so implacably, must be seen simply as one amongst many suggested forms of complex punishment. As Garland has shown, this is predominantly due to the influence of Foucault, 'whose... inflated rhetoric takes over and describes modern society as "the disciplinary society" -a "society of surveillance" in which we are all subjected to "infinite examination" in the "panoptic machine"'. D. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory, Oxford, 1990, p. 146 . Garland confronts the greatest excesses of Foucault in 'Beyond the Power Perspective: A Critique of Foucault on Punishment', ibid., ch. 7. 6 Indeed, Garland stresses that the penal theory contained within Bentham's IPML (CW) is a vision of an ideal system of punishment, and is not, as Foucault imagines it to be, an actual description of eighteenth century punishment. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, p. 163. Even a brief examination of Bentham's penal writings indicates how other forms of punishment, apart from imprisonment, could satisfy the demands of his theory.
thus the subjective approach to criminal acts led Bentham to an equally subjective approach to punishment. He urged the adoption of a principle which in modern French criminal science has been called le principe de l'individualisation de la peine.
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This essay aims to introduce the key elements both of the historical context from within which such a penal theory was developed and of the theory itself, along with some mention also of the forms of punishment recommended. First, however, a few points ought to be made concerning the texts where Bentham's penal theory is to be found.
Bentham's Punishment Writings
Bentham's ideas on punishment are contained first, within his own published works, 9 second, in a large body of extant manuscripts, and third, they are summarised in various versions produced by later editors. Reliance should be placed first and foremost upon work seen through the press by Bentham himself, though this is closely followed by manuscript material, which can provide hitherto unknown insights into
Bentham's developed thinking on the subject. As far as the 'theory of punishment' is concerned by far the most important of the printed works is An Introduction to the and substantial and profitable use can, indeed should, be made of this well-known work if his theory is to be properly understood.
Principles of Morals and Legislation
All of the key elements discussed below can be found examined in this work.
10
Despite the value of IPML, however, many valuable insights into the development of Bentham's theory have come directly from an exploration of his manuscripts and there is undoubtedly much more work to be done in the archive. Bentham's utilitarian perspective on punishment, so greatly influenced by Beccaria, identified the sources of motivation as the key to understanding what was involved in the encouragement of law-abiding behaviour. 31 Consequently, his discussion of motivation provides the obvious starting point for any analysis of his discussion of punishment.
The Sources of Motivation Equated to the Sources of Punishment
In Chapter 3 of IPML Bentham introduced a specific and fundamental division of the sources from which pain described as 'punishment' could be said to originate.
Drawing on his wider philosophy, he placed great emphasis on the variety of directing sanctions, and he carefully detailed the effective restraints on behaviour derived from the four sources of pain and pleasure. These he termed as the physical, political, moral and religious sanctions. 32 Thus pain, he explained, came from nature as the physicial sanction, from the operation of a magistrate operating according to a sovereign's will as the political or legal sanction, from the spontaneous disapproval of an individual's community as the moral sanction, and finally, from the 'hand of a superior invisible being' as the religious sanction.
In his attempt to elicit a more 'scientific' approach to the debate on punishment Bentham's attack on common, or judge-made, law and for his suggestions for reform.
He believed contemporary theories entirely misunderstood the action of pain produced by legal punishment and concluded that only a utilitarian system of positive law could respond to the complexities of offending behaviour.
Again, seeking a 'scientific' approach to punishment, Bentham went to considerable lengths to discover the effect of pain as it was inflicted on society, both In this sense an understanding that an offence was operating in a certain manner on those witnessing, or learning of such an offence, might perhaps have been more important than the question of precisely quantifying how much mischief was being produced. It could be said, therefore, that Bentham's analysis was more concerned with recognising the action of pain, unhappiness, or fear, and defining their operation in specific directions, than it was in calculating the precise quantities of pain being created. 43 With Bentham's concern for the condition of unknown, 'unassignable' individuals, who were affected at a second, third or even greater remove from the instigating mischief, there remained, it seems, little possibility of precise calculation. 44 Thus, and perhaps paradoxically, we are presented with a theory which seeks to 'calculate' likely consequences in detail yet without insisting on the assigning of precise quantities in order to be effective. is certainly at its most sophisticated and demanding as it attempts to account for the intricate and widespread nature of the distribution of pain originating from apparently 'simple' offensive actions, aware, as it is, that all can never be known for sure.
Proportionality in Punishment
Closely related to Bentham's notion of the distribution of pain of punishment are his thirteen rules of proportion. The development of specific rules for the purpose of better proportioning punishments to offences was clearly an obvious contribution to the Enlightenment project of rational explanation, and better regulation, of existing practice. These rules embodied a method of proportioning formed from an overwhelmingly utilitarian perspective. 45 With nine of his rules he established the foundations for increases in amounts of pain provided as punishment. 46 Three others protected against excesses: rules five and six limited increases in pain, whilst rule twelve provided for a positive diminution. Finally, a thirteenth rule stressed the point that precise calculation was not required and small disproportions might be ignored.
With this plan Bentham sought a mechanism for both an accurate assessment of offending and the controlled imposition of punishment.
The crux of the theory was an overwhelming emphasis placed on quantities of pain and in this respect the first five rules were of most importance: the four first [rules], we may perceive, serve to mark out the limits on the side of diminution: the limits below which a punishment ought not to be diminished: the fifth, the limits on the side of increase: the limits above which it ought not to be increased.
47
Not only was this fifth rule of proportion, which limited the increase, central to
Bentham's scheme for the reduction of punishments as observed in contemporary legal practice, but each of the first four rules added quantities of pain in such a way as to constantly make any increase proportional to the perceived increase in the severity 44 Baumgardt has stressed, following Dumont, that whilst an 'arithmetic' approach is frequently called upon, its precision is problematic, and no less so for his theory of punishment than for his moral calculus in general. See Ethics of Today, pp. 361, and 459. 45 Some small allowance was made for non-utilitarian considerations, such as satisfaction provided for victims of offences, but this was completely subordinated to Bentham's utilitarian consequentialism. 46 See IPML (CW), Ch. 14, rules 1-4 and rules 7-11, pp. 166-171. 47 Ibid., p. 169.
of the offence. Seeking such control in the infliction of pain reveals Bentham to be on common ground with a prominent strain of contemporary English reform. 48 Yet, more lenient punishment could only ever be expressed by Bentham as a reduction in the quantity of pain linked proportionately to a new, lower assessment of the pain spread by the offence. In other words, less pain of punishment could only be justified once his theory of the distribution of pains had discovered the degree of mischief to be, in fact, lower than that conventionally assumed. In these terms it can be seen that
Bentham's abovementioned theory of the distribution of pains was as important to his demand for a reduction in levels of severity as was his novel theory of proportion.
Calculation and the Surfeit of Pleasure over Pain
A further complication was introduced with Bentham's suggestion that to be appropriate the evil of punishment ought ultimately to produce a surfeit of pleasure over pain. 49 Such a requirement carried with it the implication that each and every legal punishment, regardless of the category to which it might belong, had the potential of becoming, on each new occasion it was used, morally unacceptable. 50 That is to say, in Bentham's terms, any offence might be found 'unmeet for punishment'. 51 One result of an emphasis on future benefit could be to encourage the judge, at the point of sentencing, to take the broadest view of the future consequences of both offence and recommended punishment. The focus of any 'calculation' was again identified in extremely general terms. This would, as with his theory of distribution, seem to shift Bentham's position even further away from the advocation of the need, or possibility, of precise calculation, since, with a more general approach, unassignable pains were once again included in the assessment and precise effects of offending actions could never be known for sure.
The consequences of such general, consequentialist thinking offered a significant threat to conventional, eighteenth-century theories, both of retribution and deterrence. Notions of retributive threats were almost wholly removed from
Bentham's theory of punishment, but so too was any justification of a disproportionate deterrent threat. 52 In fact, if it could be known for sure that a similar offence would never again be committed, then, from his utilitarian standpoint, he would find no justification for the infliction of any punishment. For Bentham pain, and thus punishment, was always a social negative, unless it promised greater pleasure in future.
Section 3.5: Bentham's Favoured Forms of Punishment
Bentham's preferred forms of punishment certainly changed over the course of his life. Closely related to this key element of variability were the second and third properties of equability and commensurability. 58 The former identified an equalisation of pain necessary when the same punishment was applied to different individuals, so ensuring that offenders received the same pain if they committed the same offence.
But it was the latter property of commensurability on which great importance was placed, for this allowed punishments to be proportioned to other punishments.
These elements combined to encourage Bentham to abandon in the late 1770s
his support for simply corporal inflictions of pain, and to join the enthusiastic contemporary pursuit of an increased use of penal incarceration. In terms of theory, the obvious advantage that imprisonment, and particularly panopticon imprisonment, offered was the greatly improved provision for the property of 'exemplarity'.
59
Deterrence was a primary aim, and if prisoners could be seen to be suffering, then the purpose of the punishment could be better fulfilled:
Example, or the preventing others by the terror of the example from the commission of similar offences. This is the main end of all punishment, and consequently of the particular mode [panopticon] here in question.
60
By the early-1790s, therefore, panopticon imprisonment had become without question the dominant mode of punishment promoted by Bentham. It offered adequate punishment for most, if not all, serious offences, for it could inflict both simple and complex punishment as occasion demanded. Additionally, it used the means of reward to increase its properties of reformation. Obviously Bentham envisaged the panopticon as an institution operating primarily on the psychological motivations of those incarcerated, though it should be noted that 'corporal' pain still formed an intrinsic part of the punishment. This was not, therefore, simply punishment of 'the mind' as it has sometimes been portrayed, 61 but equally it was an effective punishment of the body, and it could be so in a variety of ways.
Throughout the period of Bentham's intense focus on penitentiary imprisonment the main legal punishment for serious offences continued to be capital punishment. Bentham denounced capital punishment for possessing the detrimental qualities of inefficiency, irremissibility, positive maleficence (i.e. tending to produce crimes), and for the enhancement of evils produced by ill-applied pardons. 63 These were described as features of inaptitude, by which the punishment undermined the purpose for which it was intended, this being ultimately to produce future pleasure by inflicting legal pain. In Bentham's view the pains resulting from capital punishment, and more particularly from the widespread threat of capital punishment, were judged to be considerable and excessive.
Conclusion
Several points can be made, therefore, when examining the development of
Bentham's theory of punishment and considering his preferences for forms or modes of punishment. Once the construction of his penal theory is seen to be independent of any particular mode of punishment, and especially once it is disconnected from the constant association with panopticon imprisonment, his theoretical analysis displays considerable consistency. The ends of punishment always remain the same:
reformation, disablement and example, 64 and constant, overwhelming emphasis is placed on the assessment of quantities of pain inflicted in pursuit of these ends.
At the root of all his practical suggestions for punishment lies his treatment of an individual's motivation to act. Understanding what motivates the individual to offend is presented as the key to understanding how to prevent such offending. And general prevention, for Bentham, depends predominantly on some form of deterrent example. Those who offended seriously against society ought to be punished, first for the benefit of the society against which they have shown a disposition to offend, and second, for their own benefit, which is said to come from the opportunity for reform.
This 'reform' can be achieved both by punishment and reward. If incarcerated, for example, individuals will be habituated to new routines and activities designed to prepare them for 'survival' in an industrial environment. They will be rewarded when their behaviour is deemed non-offensive by the governing authorities. 
